Technical and Operational Guidance Notes
Explore our collection of Technical and Operational Guidance Documents—a trusted resource for professionals working in the field of Dynamic Positioning.
Each document offers practical insight and best practices from across the industry. Browse the list below and download what you need to stay informed and prepared.You may download these documents at no charge:
This draft TECHOP provides guidance on building confidence in the fault ride-through capability of low voltage AC and DC power systems on DP vessels, covering analysis, modelling, and testing methods. Comments are requested by January 31, 2027.
DPSI is a method of addressing the effects of failures, malfunctions and incompatibilities in embedded controllers that form part of a DP System. This TECHOP provides guidance on applying DNV-RP-0684 in support of achieving the intent of EBCV2 in the DP system FMEA process, describing vertical dependencies and controller authorities, with worked examples to aid in identifying unmitigated fault propagation paths.
DPSI is a method of addressing the effects of failures, malfunctions and incompatibilities in embedded controllers that form part of a DP System. This TECHOP provides guidance on applying DNV-RP-0684 in support of achieving the intent of EBCV2 in the DP system FMEA process, describing vertical dependencies and controller authorities, with worked examples to aid in identifying unmitigated fault propagation paths.
At the MTS DP Conference in Oslo, September 2019, there was unanimous assent that the content and format of such a document is not clearly defined, and that a competently prepared document could be used to identify and address issues that may compromise the redundancy concept very early in the design phase. Such a document could also be used as a tool to communicate the expected redundancy concept philosophy to all stakeholders. Thus, the MTS DP subcommittee for Guidance and Standards created this TECHOP to provide guidance on the preparation of a DP Vessel’s ‘Redundancy Concept’ or ‘Redundancy Concept Philosophy Document’ henceforth abbreviated to RCPD. The RCPD can be used in the early stages to satisfy classification society requirements for such information and, throughout the design approval process, to aid in the alignment of the multitude of diverse stakeholders who influence the design and construction of a DP vessel. Alignment with the redundancy concept will help to ensure the vessel is capable of delivering predictable, incident-free DP operations throughout its operational life.
Evidence from DP incident data and learnings from incidents (LFIs) confirms that cross-connections, commonality, external interfaces, and external influences (in and on all parts of the DP system) continue to be significant causal and contributory factors in DP incidents. They are often the reason that failure effects exceed anticipated consequences and sometimes the worst-case failure design intent. This TECHOP contains examples from actual DP incidents associated with: 1. Cross-connections between redundant equipment groups. 2. Commonality shared between redundant groups. 3. External interfaces & influences (affecting DP system as a whole).
This is an addendum to TECHOP ODP_16_P ( Competency Elements for DP Professionals – DP SME’s/DP FMEA Practitioners) addressing competency elements for DP SME’s. This addendum TECHOP provides information on topics which have been listed as “coaching and mentoring” under reference.
This TECHOP provides general guidance in conducting effective and comprehensive DP Incident Investigations.
Dialogue between regulators and industry surfaced the need to better identify the criticality and consequences of loss of position for industrial activities and the CAM or TAM configuration they are to be performed in.
This TECHOP addresses the need for and importance of providing effective guidance along with clear and unambiguous instructions on managing DP Operations to Vessel Operational Teams by way of comprehensive DP Operations Manuals.
This TECHOP discusses the use of protective functions in fault tolerant DP systems, the importance of separation between control, monitoring and protection and classification of protective functions.
This TECHOP addresses the wide variation in the scope and quality of DP FMEAs for DP vessels of all types entering service or following conversion for dynamic positioning.
This TECHOP provides general discussion on a range of common cause failure modes affecting DP systems that can often be overlooked in poor quality DP FMEAs. More detailed discussion is limited to a small group of failure modes related to generator fuel and excitation control faults and the severe voltage dips associated with short circuit faults.
This TECHOP considers the need for software testing for systems associated with computer based control systems that may affect dynamic positioning systems. The principles apply equally to any safety or mission critical systems.
DPSI is a method of addressing the effects of failures, malfunctions and incompatibilities in embedded controllers that form part of a DP System. This TECHOP provides guidance on applying DNV-RP-0684 in support of achieving the intent of EBCV2 in the DP system FMEA process, describing vertical dependencies and controller authorities, with worked examples to aid in identifying unmitigated fault propagation paths.
Intermittent faults have been identified as causal or contributory factors in a number of high-profile DP incidents. Historically, such faults have not benefited from the same level of scrutiny as hard (permanent) faults in the verification and validation processes applied to prove the single fault tolerance of DP vessels. This Techop is intended to assist stakeholders in addressing risks and consequences of intermittent faults.
The focus of this TECHOP is to address the significance of fault ride through capability. Fault ride through capability is a significant aspect of proving the fault tolerance of a DP system power plant. Its significance is further increased when the principles of independence and segregation in power plants are not adhered to as the lack of fault ride through capability can lead to a loss of position.
This TECHOP describes how to create an Annual DP Trials program that complies with the requirements of IMCA M190 & M191 using information obtained from the vessel’s DP Failure Modes and Effects Analysis and associated proving trials program.
This TECHOP describes the need for automatic blackout recovery on DP vessels, Design objectives, Desirable features, Undesirable features, Testing automatic blackout recovery and Preparation of specifications for BOR systems on DP vessels.
This MTS TECHOP identifies competency elements that are desirable in DP professionals functioning in roles as DP SMEs in organizations as well as FMEA Practitioners. The TECHOP leverages the guidance documents published by the MTS DP Committee and utilizes the format of the Professional Development of DP Personnel Tool – PDDP2 (Formerly known as the MDAT) to provide a structured approach to obtaining and demonstrating the identified competencies.
The discussion includes an explanation of how the operational concepts of Critical Activity Mode (CAM) and Task Appropriate Mode (TAM) can influence the development of an annual trials program for MODUs based on IMCA M191,which allows the trials program to be spread over a year.
Many DP incidents involve DGNSS position reference sensors. This TECHOP addresses issues associated with DGNSS from the perspective of operations, design and people.
This TECHOP addresses the wide variation in the scope and quality of DP FMEAs for DP vessels of all types entering service or following conversion for dynamic positioning.
This TECHOP addresses DP FMEA proving trials and important tests which should be carried out to validate certain types of DP Class 2 and DP Class 3 redundancy concept. 2.1.2 This revision includes a DP FMEA proving trials gap analysis template that can be used to gauge the scope of a DP FMEA proving trials program in relation to the class of vessel (DP Class 2 or 3) and the power plant configuration (bus ties open or bus ties closed).
This TECHOP impacts MTS DP Operations Guidance Document Part 2 Appendix 1, it incorporates high level philosophy statements about: Identifying DP as a Safety Critical Element; Additional information to be incorporated in Operations Manual; Establishing a Vessel Specific Drive off to Drift off strategy; Reinstatement of equipment post failure.
This MTS TECHOP provides general guidance on PRSs and the handling of the PRS by the DPCS. It is intended to enhance awareness of issues that have led to DP station keeping incidents and good practices to mitigate against such potential. The TECHOP promotes ‘systems thinking’ application to PRSs and handling of PRS by DPCS as a means to achieve incident free DP operations.
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